‧The Renminbi and Poor-Country Growth – OECD （摘要版：Global imbalances, the renminbi, and poor-country growth – VOX）
關於中國經濟，目前很多人批評它拼命出口到歐美國家（低估人民幣）累積外匯，造成全球經濟失衡。這篇OECD的paper換個角度，從其他發展中國家的角度，談中國的發展對其他較窮的發展中國家有何影響，以這角度切入目前關於中國經濟的辯論。
大致可分成兩部分。第一部份是研究中國經濟成長對於其他國家的影響，迴歸分析發現對於其他窮國大致是正面的。研究中還指出，2000年以後中國的競爭優勢確實出現提升；1997年之前中國產品對其他低收入的發展中國家具有價格壓力，而在1997年之後則是對中等收入的發展中國家造成壓力，對低收入國家則否。
第二部分則是將此種影響帶入目前的人民幣匯率爭論，指出人民幣快速升值對於其他發展中國家也有害，因為其他國近年來得益於中國經濟的帶動，如果人民幣快速升值（超出其應該有的、根據自身發展情況的逐步升值）而使中國經濟減速，這些發展中國家（尤其是窮國）將連帶受到衝擊。
但應注意，前面提過，中國產品目前對中等收入國家具有價格壓力，所以如果人民幣升值，中等收入國家可以在價格競爭方面得到利益；不過，由於這些國家目前同時也得益於中國成長的帶動效果，所以人民幣升值帶來的效應將是一正一負，總的結果並不確定。
同時，由於中國的生產效率高於其他發展中國家，因此即使中國的生產有一大部份因為人民幣升值而轉移到其他國家，就發展中國家整體而言，也不會帶來與中國生產同等的成長（例如減貧）效果。
‧Global Imbalances: An unconventional view – IDEAs
這篇更特別，俄羅斯的這位Vladimir Popov對各發展中國家壓低匯率進行出口導向發展的模式給予正面肯定，認為這似乎是目前看來唯一可行的趕超戰略，而西方國家除了美國與英國之外，貿易逆差都不算高，應該還可以承受更多債務，如此將能改變數百年來落後國家與先進的西方國家差距不斷擴大的趨勢。
這觀點非常片面，不過確實說出了一些有趣的東西，而且是大白話。
There is strong evidence that the accumulation of reserves can spur long-term growth in developing countries, although not in rich countries. If all countries use these policies, all will lose, and, on top of that, for developed countries this policy does not work. But for developing countries it works, and there are good reasons why these countries should have sufficient policy space to use this tool to promote catch up development.
Accumulation of reserves means that the country saves more than it invests, produces more than it consumes, providing its savings to finance investment and consumption in other countries. This may sound like a drag on development; it is often argued that capital should flow from rich to poor countries because K/L ratios are lower in developing countries and hence the returns on capital are greater. However, this is only one effect. The other effect is a dynamic one and it works in a completely opposite direction: if a country manages somehow to become competitive in the world markets (either through higher productivity or through lower wages or through low exchange rate), it starts to export more than it imports and develops a trade surplus. If this surplus is stored in the form of foreign exchange reserves, the exchange rate gets undervalued and the trade surplus persists. That is why countries that develop faster than the others usually have a trade surplus (United States in the twentieth century before the 1970s, Japan and Germany after the Second World War, East Asian Tigers and Dragons and China, of course). Accumulation of reserves (that are invested in reliable short-term government securities and yield very low interest rates) implies losses to the national economy (Rodrik, 2006), but every policy has costs – this is a price to pay for promoting growth.
The argument against the policy of reserve accumulation and undervaluation of the exchange rate for developing countries is the following: if all poor countries would pursue this policy, developed countries would finally accumulate unsustainable levels of debts and the inevitable subsequent adjustment could be painful.
But even today the debt of the rich countries is not that high. US has net international indebtedness of about 30% of GDP, Euro area has net international liabilities of 16% of GDP, and Japan is a net creditor with net international assets of nearly 50% of GDP.
As the table below suggests, it is exactly developing countries that are the major international debtors, whereas developed countries (with a notable exception of US and UK) are mostly net creditors; so there is still room for the West to go into debt.
To conclude, reserve accumulation works as a development tool (theoretically, every externality could be taken care of through taxes, but in practice selective policies rarely work). Because protectionism is currently de facto outlawed by WTO, exchange rate protectionism is the only available tool for promoting catch up development, in a way – the instrument of last resort. Reserve accumulation in poor countries will not continue forever; it will come to an end, once they catch up with the West. Meanwhile, developed countries get a chance to consume more than they produce. Why not go into debt to help the global South catch up with the West sooner?
